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TALKING TO JUDGES ABOUT THE ART OF JUDGING: AN ANNOTATED 
PERFORMANCE TEXT 
 
Greta Bird and Nicole Rogers* 
 
[We performed this paper at the Judicial Reasoning: Art or Science? conference held at 
the Australian National University in February 2009. We were performing on at least two 
levels: as academics and editors of a collection of judicially-authored essays on the art of 
judging but also, as we proclaimed at the outset, as Jester and Fool. We did not appear 
in costume as jesters or fools. We did not even appear as fairies, although one of us is 
well-known at Southern Cross University for donning fairy wings and fairy tales featured 
in this performance (as did sheep, land rights and playfulness). But then, our audience of 
judges had also left their costumes behind; there were no wigs or robes. They were in 
civilian clothes, recognisable only as judges through name tags. They were, in fact, 
unmasked. 
 
Greta began by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land. Nicole then spoke. 
The accompanying slide portrays a fool, colourfully clad, balanced lightly and without 
any apparent concern at the edge of a precipice, and a jester in classic costume.] 
 
Our focus is on judging as performance and judging as playfulness. We write as 
outsiders, in the guise of the Jester and the Fool: playful figures who are outside the law. 
Brian Sutton-Smith argues that the Fool ‘live[s] in the place where the “writ does not 
run”’.1  
 
We are also influenced, however, by our role as editors of a recent collection of articles 
on the art of judging. The articles were written by judges, retired judges and magistrates, 
and the collection was published as a special issue of the Southern Cross University Law 
Review in 2008.2  
 
After we had received our twelve contributions, we were struck by some common 
themes. One of these was the emphasis on impartiality in judging. According to the 
contributors, impartiality and independence from the executive were essential attributes 
of judging. What happens, then, to judging at a time in which the executive arms of 
government in Western nations have assumed extraordinary powers in response to the 
war on terror, at a time designated by political theorist Giorgio Agamben and a host of 
                                                
* Associate Professor Greta Bird and Dr Nicole Rogers are members of the School of Law and Justice, 
Southern Cross University. For many years, they have taught law together using dance, music, images, 
popular culture, role plays and a variety of other performative devices, including fairy wings. 
1 Brian Sutton-Smith, The Ambiguity of Play (1997) 212. 
2 (2008) 12 Southern Cross University Law Review. 
 Public Space: The Journal o f Law and Social Justice (2009) Vol 3, Art 4, pp 1-18. 2 
other commentators as a ‘state of exception’?3 How can these qualities of independence 
and impartiality be maintained by judges, and at what personal cost? 
 
We will begin by considering some of the features of the contemporary manifestation of a 
state of exception in Western nations and look at the implications for judging and the rule 
of law. We then want to turn to the second question. It is, we argue, in acknowledging the 
importance of the performative qualities of judging that we find one explanation as to 
how the process of judging can remain independent of the will of the executive and retain 
at least the appearance of impartiality and openness.  
 
Furthermore, we will argue that judging is aligned with justice because it is not only 
performance but, incongruously enough, a form of playfulness. We will look at examples 
of playfulness in judging, in the Mabo decision4 and in the practice of dissent as 
exemplified in the judgments of the recently-retired Justice Kirby. We will conclude with 
an illustration of the ‘awfulness of lawfulness’, in the form of a decision in which the 
majority judges were not sufficiently playful to play with the rules: the Al-Kateb 
decision.5  
 
THE MODERN STATE OF EXCEPTION 
 
[At this point we inserted some dialogue from a play, David Hare’s Stuff Happens, to 
illustrate the connection between the war on terror and the modern state of exception. 
Nicole explains that David Hare used the public statements of Western political leaders 
in writing his play, but he also used his imagination ‘when the doors close on the world’s 
leaders and on their entourages’.6 
 
Rumsfeld:  I liked what you said earlier sir. A war on terror. That’s good. 
That’s vague. 
Cheney:  It’s good. 
Rumsfeld:  That way we can do anything.7] 
 
Carl Schmitt was a German theorist who at the time of the Weimar Republic developed a 
theoretical model of a state of exception, in which the rule of law was set aside.8 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, he would become a supporter of the ongoing state of exception set up by 
Nazi decree in Germany between 1933 and 1945. His ideas have been revived by a 
                                                
3 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception ( Kevin Attell trans, 2005) 2, 87; see also Jude McCulloch and Bree 
Carlton, ‘Preempting Justice: suppression of financing of terrorism and the “war on terror”’ (2006) 17 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 397, 400–10; Lee Godden, ‘Terrorism: Reinvoking the barbarian to 
secure the space of civilisation’ (2006) 24 Australian Feminist Law Journal 69; Matthew Sharpe, ‘ 
“Thinking of the extreme situation …” On the new anti-terrorism laws or against a recent (theoretical and 
legal) return to Carl Schmitt’ (2006) 24 Australian Feminist Law Journal 95; and Antonia Quadara, ‘David 
Hicks in/as the event of terror’ (2006) 24 Australian Feminist Law Journal 141. 
4 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; (1992) 107 ALR 1. 
5 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124. 
6 David Hare, Stuff Happens (2004) Author’s Note. 
7 Ibid 24. 
8 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (George Schwab trans, 
1985). 
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contemporary political theorist, Giorgio Agamben, who has contended that the modern 
Western political landscape resembles a state of exception in the ongoing erosion of the 
rule of law, the assumption of extraordinary powers by the executive, and the 
simultaneous dismissal of certain hitherto fundamental human rights. In the modern 
Western political landscape we find, according to Agamben, the obliteration of the 
normative aspect of law by governmental violence which violates international law but 
nevertheless is presented as an application of law.9 
 
[An accompanying slide juxtaposes an image of the entrance to Auschwitz with an image 
of the orange-clad prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, kneeling behind barbed wire. At the 
conference dinner, an earnest young lawyer will tell us that we were wrong to compare 
Guantanamo Bay with a concentration camp. Furthermore, the reviewer of this article 
queried this juxtaposition and felt that the point needed to be ‘carefully and thoughtfully 
unpacked’.] 
 
The state of exception is exemplified in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany10 and 
in, according to Agamben, Judith Butler and many others, the extra-judicial arena of 
Guantanamo Bay.11 Both environments encompass what Agamben refers to as ‘the pure 
absolute and impassable biopolitical space.’12 In both environments, human beings are 
stripped of their rights, expectations and humanity;13 they become, in Agamben’s 
terminology, ‘bare life’, and as such can be killed with impunity.14 In such environments, 
homo sacer is controlled and disciplined by the biopolitical mechanisms of the sovereign 
state and has no recourse to the protection of law. 
 
[In illustrating the ambiguous status of homo sacer, we use the image of an orange-clad 
prisoner prone on a stretcher and the following words from a judge, Lord Justice Steyn of 
the English House of Lords: 
 
The question is whether the quality of justice envisaged for the prisoners at Guantanamo 
Bay complies with minimum international standards for the conduct of fair trials. The 
answer can be given quite shortly. It is a resounding No . . .15] 
 
Even outside these archetypal states of exception, we find today, if not the lawless void 
which constitutes a state of exception, both political and judicial acceptance of 
biopolitical strategies as mechanisms to survey and discipline the bodies of accused 
terrorists, ongoing references to exceptionalism, and claims that the rule of law should 
not apply in the war on terror. In particular, after the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal 
                                                
9 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attell trans, 2005) 87. 
10 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: sovereign power and bare life (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans, 1998) 20, 
169. 
11 Agamben, above n 9, 4; Judith Butler, Precarious Life: the Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004) 60-
2. 
12 Agamben, above n 10, 123. 
13 Ibid 159. 
14 Ibid 82. 
15 Johan Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The legal black hole’, Twenty-seventh F A Mann lecture, delivered 25 
November 2003 < http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf>. 
 Public Space: The Journal o f Law and Social Justice (2009) Vol 3, Art 4, pp 1-18. 4 
set aside the two convictions of accused terrorist Jack Thomas, deep misgivings were 
expressed by various conservative commentators about the role of what was described as 
‘the blackest of black-letter law’ in exceptional times.16 In fact, the Court of Appeal 
judges had ruled that the prosecution’s evidence was inadmissible because it had been 
obtained under conditions of inducement and pressure.17 
 
In such a climate, the temptation is there for judging to be part of the power apparatus of 
the state. In circumstances in which the executive, with appropriate legislative 
endorsement, is exercising an extraordinary degree of power and justifying this by 
reference to exceptionalism, judges can confer legitimacy upon such exercises of power18 
or, alternatively, choose to condemn it. Here we want to move on to look at the 
performative aspects of judging which assist the judiciary in maintaining their 
independence from the executive, and thus their prized impartiality. 
 
JUDGING AS PERFORMANCE 
 
[The image we used here is that of a grim-faced New South Wales Supreme Court judge, 
in wig and red robe, sitting in judgment beneath the Latin motto and coat of arms which 
symbolises and supports the authority of court.] 
 
From the traditional positivist perspective, law is a concrete set of rules and principles. In 
law, as David Fraser has pointed out, we assume that truth resides in ‘sacred text and 
hierarchy’ and ‘it is heresy to go beyond the text’.19 However, as Margaret Davies has 
pointed out, there is no law outside or prior to performance – whether this be the 
‘performative utterances of the monarch’ or the performances of the courtroom.20 Law 
might endure as text but it is made as performance. Anthony Kubiak, a theatre studies 
scholar, believes that the structures of socio-political power, including legal structures, 
could not have come into being ‘without some implied and already recognised structure 
of performance’.21 From this perspective, law is a verb rather than a noun.22 
 
To focus on judging as performance is to venture into the relatively new discipline of 
performance studies. Performance studies scholars analyse an extraordinary range of 
social and cultural activities as performances and are interested, inter alia, in the politics 
of performance, and the relationship between performances and power.23 Thus, looking at 
                                                
16 See Editorial, ‘A battle lost in war on terror’, The Australian (Sydney), 21 August 2006  
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au>. 
17 R v Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475, 503. 
18 As, in fact, the High Court majority chose to do in upholding the validity of Division 104 of the Criminal 
Code in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194. 
19 David Fraser, ‘Truth and hierarchy – will the circle be unbroken?’ (1984) 33 Buffalo Law Review 729, 
746. 
20 Margaret Davies, Delimiting the Law. ‘Postmodernism’ and the Politics of Law (1996) 97–98. 
21 Anthony Kubiak, Stages of Terror. Terrorism, Ideology and Coercion as Theatre History (1991) 5. 
22 This approach is similar to that taken by performance studies scholars, who view culture as a verb rather 
than as a noun. See Dwight Conquergood, ‘Rethinking ethnography: towards a critical cultural politics’ 
(1991) 58 Communications Monograph 179, 190. 
23 Ibid. 
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judging through the lens of performance studies theory enables us to address the question 
of how judges can remain independent of an increasingly powerful executive. 
 
[In moving on to look at the performance of judging, we wanted a more light-hearted 
image of judges. We chose an image which had appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald 
at the start of the law year. A group of New South Wales Supreme Court judges are 
pictured leaving a somewhat impressive building – probably St James cathedral. Their 
wigs and red and white robes are fully visible. Several judges are beaming and one 
appears to be skipping down the steps. No doubt this misrepresents his gait but 
nevertheless, possibly because the judges’ costumes are similar to that of Santa Claus, 
the picture conjures up an atmosphere of playfulness.] 
 
Of course, the performative, even theatrical qualities of the courtroom have long been 
recognised. It is arguable that the courtroom provides more moving and powerful 
performances than the theatre. Sir Alan Moses, Justice of the English Court of Appeal, 
begins his essay ‘The Mask and the Judge’ in our collection with an extract from another 
essay: one written in 1908 by an English theatre critic. The extract begins: 
 
In the courts I find satisfied in me, just those senses which in the theatre, nearly always 
are starved.24 
 
In the courtroom, there are actors; there is live performance; there are costumes and even 
wigs, which Johan Huizinga in his classic work Homo Ludens compared to ‘the dancing 
masks of savages’25 (we will come back to masks) and there is, of course, an audience. 
Of course, court personnel and even judges may prefer to distinguish the courtroom 
performance from theatrical performance. In 2007, a sheriff’s office had to point out that 
the courtroom was neither a café nor a theatre when people tried to reserve seats at 
Marcus Einfeld’s committal hearing.26 In that same year, the High Court ordered a re-trial 
on the basis that the courtroom re-creation of a hold up, in which the accused was asked 
to assume the role of the robber, was unfair.27 
 
[Our audience laughs at this.] 
 
If judging constitutes performance, what sort of performance is it? Here it is useful to 
turn to Victor Turner’s model of a social drama.  
 
[We leave behind our modern judges in their medieval costumes and display now a 
primitive figure, wearing horns and brandishing ceremonial objects, silhouetted against 
a fire. After our performance, we will be approached by a young legal anthropologist, 
who is pleased that we referred to Turner.] 
 
                                                
24 Sir Alan Moses, ‘The Mask and the Judge’ (2008) 12 Southern Cross University Law Review 1, 1. 
25 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1950) 77. 
26 Kate McClymont, ‘Einfeld sent to trial on 13 charges’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 
December 2007, 3. 
27 Jonathon Pearlman, ‘Robber disguise ruled unfair’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 December 
2007, 7. 
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Victor Turner, a social anthropologist and co-founder of the discipline of performance 
studies, focused on investigating the relationship between social drama and aesthetic 
drama, between ritual and theatre. He argued that all performative genres develop from 
the social drama, which consists of the following sequence: breach, crisis, the application 
of redressive or remedial procedures, and either reintegration or the recognition and 
legitimation of schism.28 He hastened to add that social dramas could take a different 
direction in times of major social change, when there was no longer consensus over 
values; at such times, the redressive procedures frequently failed to resolve conflict.29 
 
The performance of judging is part of the redressive or remedial process and Turner 
pointed out that often, during this phase of the social drama, a liminal or threshold space 
is created which permits scrutiny or introspection. At this point, the events leading up to 
and composing the crisis are frequently reproduced and then critiqued; at this point, there 
is performance.30 Yet the performance of the courtroom and the performance of judging 
are quite distinct from the aesthetic performances which often take place once the social 
drama is over, and which address the entire social drama, imitating and assigning 
meaning to it.31 Judicial performance, and similarly, the performances of ritual which 
also comprise part of the ‘redressive machinery of spontaneous social drama’, ‘[attain] 
only a limited degree of reflexivity’ because they ‘[lie] . . . on the same plane as the 
agonistic events being scrutinized.’32 Theatrical re-enactments of social dramas are ‘a 
meta performance, a performance about a performance’,33 whereas legal performances 
and the performance of judging are functional performances within the social drama. 
 
[We become a little daring now with our images, drawing on popular culture for our 
inspiration. Under the heading ‘The judge and the mask’, we superimpose an image of 
the masked and invincible avenger, of fiction and the movie screen: Batman.] 
 
We have already referred to Lord Justice Moses’ essay ‘The Mask and the Judge’. Lord 
Justice Moses last year ruled that the decision of the British government to discontinue an 
inquiry into allegedly corrupt dealings between Saudi Arabia and a leading global 
weapons manufacturer was unlawful because it was made in response to threats from 
Saudi officials. Moses stated that ‘No one, whether within this country or outside, is 
entitled to interfere with the course of justice.’ 34 
 
We have heard about the ‘cloak’ of judicial independence from David Brown35 but Lord 
Justice Moses’ focus is on the mask: the mask which distinguishes the judge from 
                                                
28 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre. The Human Seriousness of Play (1982) 69. This process could be 
used to describe colonisation in Australia. 
29 Victor Turner, The Anthropology of Performance (1987) 35. 
30 Ibid 34-5. 
31 Ibid 95. 
32 Ibid 107. 
33 Ibid 107. 
34 Peter Walker, ‘SFO wrong to drop BAE inquiry, court rules’, The Guardian (London), 10 April 2008 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/10/bae.armstrade>. 
35 David Brown, ‘Judging the judges’ (1984) Australian Society 21, 21. 
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administrator and counsellor.36 He observes that ‘we forget symbols to our peril.’37 
Moses draws parallels between theatre and judging in discussing the significance of the 
mask, which separates actors and judges from their audience.38 He also sees the 
connection between judging and ritual. Law was once indistinguishable from religion and 
magic and derived its mystique from the status of judges as priests, prophets and 
oracles.39 Despite the secularisation of law and the separation of law from religion and 
magic, the mask remains the essential symbol of judicial authority. He concludes: 
 
Judges diminish the authority which a legal decision requires when they speak without a 
mask. Without the mask, they can no longer be distinguished from any other member of 
the executive or government; they are deprived of authority. The judge is least himself 
when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask and he will tell you the truth.40 
 
The judge’s mask is, of course, a metaphorical concept; it is not the ‘soft leather, thin and 
ambiguous’ mask41 of theatre. It is much more than the judicial costume and other 
trappings of judicial power,42 the ‘cloaks and wigs of archaic practice’.43 It is ‘the form 
through which judges deliver their decisions’;44 with the assumption of the mask comes 
the apparent abnegation of the individual and the purported ‘surrender of individual 
judgment’.45 
 
Thus it is the performative aspects of judging, judging as masked performance, which 
provides the necessary distance and independence from the executive. Furthermore, in 
donning their mask, judges are above and hence outside the law, like Batman or the 
sovereign in Agamben’s state of exception,46 or even like Batman’s nemesis, the Joker, 
another masked figure outside the law. Judges, once masked, cannot simultaneously 
declare the law, and be subject to the law. Once unmasked, they are of course subject to 
the law. Indeed, the unmasked judge is perhaps more subject to the law than others, as the 
particularly punitive zeal of the state in relation to the activities of former judge Marcus 
Einfeld and scapegoat High Court judge Lionel Murphy suggests. 
 
[Continuing with our Batman analogy, we use here the powerful image of Heath Ledger 
as the Joker, the outlaw whose damaged face is a form of a mask. On the screen appears 
the following statement from director of the Batman movie, Tim Burton: 
  
                                                
36 Moses, above n 25, 21. 
37 Ibid 15. 
38 Ibid 6. 
39 Ibid 9 – 10. 
40 Ibid 23. 
41 Ibid 4. 
42 Ibid 15. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 11. 
46 Agamben writes: ‘That the sovereign is a living law can only mean that he is not bound by it . . .’; 
Agamben, above n 9, 69. 
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The Joker is such a great character because there's a complete freedom to him. Any 
character who operates on the outside of society and is deemed a freak and an outcast 
then has the freedom to do what they want.47 
 
We want to suggest that the outsider status which we voluntarily assumed at the 
beginning of the performance is as much part of the identity of the judge (once masked) 
as it is part of the identity of the outlaw.] 
 
Yet there is more to judging than masked performance; it is more than the mask which 
distinguishes judging from, for instance, the meticulous rule-following of a murderous 
bureaucracy, from the ‘awfulness of lawfulness’.48 Judging, we would contend, is the 
pursuit of justice; thus it is akin to playfulness.  
 
JUDGING AS PLAYFULNESS 
 
[It is with the temerity of the jester that we stand before a group of judges and tell them 
that they are playful. Could this perhaps be contempt of court? We press on, using 
images from tarot cards of the Fool and the Hanged Man. After all, for a playful activity, 
judging can have some very dire consequences.] 
  
What do we mean by playfulness? Roger Callois argues that there are two very different 
forms of play at either end of the spectrum of play: at one end, we find rule-bound 
orderly play and at the other we find unpredictable free play, characterized by ‘diversion, 
turbulence, free improvisation and carefree gaiety.’49 Mihai Spariosu calls these two 
types of play rational and pre-rational and locates the origins of both forms of play in 
classical Greece. According to Spariosu, these two forms of play have been engaged in an 
ongoing ‘contest for cultural authority’.50 One could argue that rational play is associated 
with the modernist impulse to create order, boundaries and classifications, while pre-
rational play is aligned to postmodernism. 
 
Play in its pre-rational guise can also be designated as playfulness: it is unpredictable and 
disruptive of all rules and expectations. Thus, playfulness seems quite distinct from the 
rule-bound character of rational play. 51 In fact, playfulness exists outside such play; it 
encompasses ‘play[ing] with the frames of play itself’.52 It is, of course, the tool of trade 
of the trickster and jester but is it the tool of trade of the judge? 
 
                                                
47 Quoted in Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batman_(1989_film)#cite_note-Elfman-0> 
48 This phrase appears in the title of the following article: Sam Blay and Ryzard Piotrowicz, ‘The 
Awfulness of Lawfulness: Some Reflections on the Tension between International and Domestic Law,’ 
(2000) 21 Australian Year Book of International Law 1. It has also been subsequently used by our 
colleague, Shelley Bielefeld, as the title of a poem. 
49 Roger Callois, Man, Play and Games (Meyer Barash trans, 1979) 13. 
50 Mihai I Spariosu, Dionysus Reborn. Play and the Aesthetic Dimension in Modern Philosophical and 
Scientific Discourse (1989) 6. 
51 Sutton-Smith, above n 1, 148. 
52 Ibid. 
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Many people would assume that judging is rule-bound orderly play; after all, as Margaret 
Davies has pointed out, the performance of law is ‘deadly serious’.53 Playfulness is 
anarchic, irrelevant, capricious and unpredictable.54 Surely there is no room for 
playfulness in the courtroom. 
 
[We produce here the images of a bearded and defiant Jerry Rubin, appearing before the 
United States House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in bizarre fancy 
dress. In the hearing room, he is surrounded by men and women dressed in conservative 
outfits; in the second photo, a woman, encountering him on the steps outside the hearing 
room, looks positively horrified. This is an example of playfulness in a political rather 
than a legal setting. Nevertheless, the images suggest the conflict between playfulness in 
one of its most anarchic forms and law, as represented in the conservative, rule-bound 
proceedings of a quasi-legal hearing. 
 
At this point, there is an aporia in the text of our performance. At this point, we are both 
silently reflecting upon and editing out of the performance our own use of playfulness in 
a Ballina courtroom. In 1994, both of us participated in a breastfeeding protest after a 
young breastfeeding woman was evicted from the courtroom.55 Alas, we do not have the 
defiant courage of the Fool in our first image, who struts near the edge of a precipice 
without any visible qualms. In front of an audience of judicial Big Daddies,56 we refrain 
from mentioning our own unruly behaviour in the courtroom.] 
 
According to Callois, forms of rational play are used to absorb and discipline 
playfulness.57 Indeed, when playfulness has been introduced into the courtroom, it tends 
to undermine the authority of legal performances. An example of this can be found in the 
disruption of HUAC by activists in the 1960s. The Committee may not have been a court 
but it had successfully terrorised suspected Communists in a series of publicised hearings 
in the 1950s. HUAC was undone by the Yippies. Jerry Rubin, for instance, decided to 
view HUAC as a ‘costume ball’.58 In his first appearance, he wore the costume of an 
American Revolutionary soldier. For his second appearance, he wore a Black Panther 
beret, Viet Cong pyjamas, bells and bullets, painted his body with psychedelic designs 
and carried a toy rifle.59 When he attempted to return to HUAC for a final appearance as 
Santa Claus, he was refused entry.60 
 
[The next slide, headed the awfulness of lawfulness, depicts a succession of identical 
sheep with one black sheep in their midst.] 
 
                                                
53 Davies, above n 21, 132. 
54 Callois, above n 50, 13. 
55 Nicole Rogers, ‘Stepping out of the ivory tower with contemptuous breasts’ (1994) 19 Alternative Law 
Journal 115. 
56 See Ellen Donkin and Susan Clements (eds), Upstaging Big Daddy. Directing Theater as if Gender and 
Race Matter (1993). 
57 Callois, above n 50, 13. 
58 Jerry Rubin, Do it! Scenarios of the Revolution (1970) 60. 
59 Ibid 203. 
60 Ibid 207. 
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We would argue, however, that playfulness appears in judging where judging departs 
from the rules. The idea that judges decide cases simply by following rules has long since 
been dismissed as a myth; as Lionel Murphy famously stated, the doctrine of precedent is 
well-suited to a nation populated overwhelmingly by sheep.61 Judges can and do depart 
from rules in pursuit of justice. As Derrida pointed out, justice is ‘rebellious to rule’;62 it 
is singular, incalculable and elusive.63 It ‘exceeds law and calculation’.64 It is, in fact, 
akin to playfulness, to playing with the frames of play. And like playfulness, justice can 
be volatile and explosive. 
 
We will now talk about a moment of playfulness in the history of judging – a departure 
from rules and precedents which indeed proved to be volatile and explosive but which 
was clearly done in pursuit of justice: the Mabo decision. 
 
[At this point, Nicole concedes her place at the microphone to Greta. Normally, when we 
perform together, the one who is not speaking constantly interjects; students tell us in 
their written feedback sheets that they enjoy our ‘banter’. We have modified our normal 
performative behaviour in order to perform in front of judges. Other than in exceptional 
circumstances, the only person permitted to interrupt in a courtroom is a judge. 
 
The next slide depicts a fairy, wearing a crown of butterflies, with the caption: Do we 
believe in fairy tales? 
 
Greta begins by thanking our host, Professor Michael Coper, for introducing us to 
playfulness. At this point, there is a non-judicial interjection, a robust ‘Steady on!’ from 
Michael Coper who is sitting in the front row, and this is greeted with laughter. Greta 
goes on to explain that she is referring to the playfulness of his work Encounters with the 
Australian Constitution, or what Nicole has described elsewhere as his unusually light-
hearted approach to Constitutional Law.65] 
 
 
THE PARADOX OF JUSTICE: RESPONDING TO THE OTHER 
 
As Derrida has pointed out, a just decision is one which is both regulated by law and 
unregulated.66 He also has theorised that justice is impossible.67 He writes that ‘justice 
would be the experience that we are not able to experience . . . there is no justice without 
                                                
61 Lionel Murphy, ‘The Responsibility of Judges’ in Gareth Evans (ed), Law, Politics and the Labor 
Movement (1980) 5. 
62 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ (Mary Quaintance trans, 1990 
ed) in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice (1992) 22. 
63 Ibid 16-7. 
64 Ibid 28. 
65 Nicole Rogers, ‘The Playfulness of Constitutional Law’ (2005) 9 Southern Cross University Law Review 
183, 186. 
66 Derrida, above n 63, 23; Derrida states that ‘for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper 
moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation’. 
67 Ibid 27. 
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this experience, however impossible it may be, of aporia. Justice is an experience of the 
“impossible”.’68 Justice requires a singularity: a response to the other person that does not 
deny their difference.69 Law, on the other hand, assumes sameness by dismissing 
differences as irrelevant, and reducing such differences to generalisations. The legal 
decision ‘simply consists of applying the law’ and is one where ‘the judge is a calculating 
machine’.70 
 
Law, certainly according to orthodox positivist thought, is independent of morality. 
However justice, according to Emmanuel Levinas, lies in an ethics of alterity, where the 
injustice suffered by another person calls forth a response from us.71 Judges are 
frequently called on to make ethical decisions and, in the oppressive political climate 
described earlier in this paper, such decisions may be politically unpopular. Yet judges 
must make their decisions by taking the long view and remembering the future. Their 
performance of law becomes part of the fabric of history and anticipates that history.  
 
Thus, the finding of an aporia in the Mabo case permitted a ‘line of flight’72 that has 
delivered some measure of land justice and hope for Indigenous Australians. The 
decision however falls short of a justice that engages with Indigenous perspectives. It 
legimitises the ‘act of state’ that ushered in white sovereignty over the continent. As 
Watson writes, ‘Aboriginal sovereignty [is] unspeakable’.73 The case anticipated the 
speech made by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in February 2008, known as ‘the apology’, 
and this speech provided relief for some members of the stolen generation and a moment 
of redemption for white Australians.74 
 
PLAYFULNESS, LAND RIGHTS AND MABO 
 
Greta identifies the starting point for land justice in Australia in the fight by the Gurindji 
people of the Northern Territory for their land. They were working in the pastoral 
industry for rations on their traditional lands which were ‘owned’ in white law by Lord 
Vestey. Vincent Lingiari and his mob decided to walk off, sit down and go on strike. 
Unlike other striking workers they did not want to receive wages; instead, they wanted 
their land. After an eight year struggle for land justice, the Gurindji people succeeded in 
having an area of their own land excised from the Vestey pastoral lease in 1975.  
 
[In the accompanying slide, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam pours a handful of earth in 
Vincent’s hand to symbolise the transfer in white law of traditional lands to the Gurindji 
people. This powerful performative moment has been described in the Kev Carmody/Paul 
Kelly song, From Little Things Big Things Grow. 
                                                
68 Ibid 16. 
69 Ibid 23. 
70 Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (2001) 74. 
71 Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the other (Nidra Poller trans, 2003). 
72 Paul Patton, Deleuze and the political (2000) 126. 
73 Irene Watson, ‘Settled and unsettled spaces: are we free to roam?’ in Alison Moreton-Robinson, 
Sovereign subjects: Indigenous sovereignty matters (2007) 20. 
74 Gary Foley, ‘Duplicity and deceit: Rudd’s apology to the Stolen Generations’ (2008) 36 Melbourne 
Historical Journal <http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_28.html>. 
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Without the technological means to play this song, Greta instead recites some of the 
lyrics.  
 
British Lord Vestey and Vincent Lingiari were opposite men on opposite sides 
Vestey was fat with money and muscle 
Beef was his business 
Broad was his door 
Vincent was lean and spoke very little 
He had no bank balance 
Hard dirt was his floor. 
 
Gurindji were working for nothing but rations  
They picked up their swags and started off walking 
At Wattie Creek they sat themselves down  
Vincent said we’re sitting right here till we get our land. 
 
             (Vincent goes to Sydney and gets yarning.)  
 
Eight years go by 
Eight long years of waiting 
Till one day a tall stranger appeared in the land 
And he came with lawyers and he came with great ceremony 
And through Vincent’s fingers poured a handful of sand 
This is the story how power and privilege cannot move a people 
Who know where they stand and who stand in their law.] 
 
Shortly after this incident, the first land rights law, the Northern Territory Land Rights 
Act, was drafted by the Whitlam government and subsequently passed by the Fraser 
government. In 1986, the Gurindji people’s claim under this legislation was successful. 
These events preceded the ground-breaking Mabo decision, in which some of the central 
myths of legitimacy of the Australian legal system were challenged and displaced and 
others reinforced. 
 
[We now show an image of Eddie Mabo, wearing a sarong, standing with a companion 
on the island of Mer.] 
 
Playfulness is a serious business which allows rules to be re-shaped and new possibilities 
to emerge. This is apparent in the Mabo case. Previously, the dispossession of Aboriginal 
people had been legitimated through the fiction of ‘terra nullius’ and an earlier attempt to 
displace this fiction in the Gove Land Rights case75 had failed. Justice Blackburn, sitting 
as a single judge, had acknowledged the complexities of the laws governing traditional 
Aboriginal societies, describing ‘a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the 
country in which the people led their lives’.76 He called this ‘a government of laws and 
                                                
75 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141. 
76 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267. 
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not of men’.77 Nevertheless, according to Justice Blackburn, the plaintiffs did not have a 
proprietary relationship to their land.78 Until the Mabo decision, therefore, the common 
law was ‘frozen’ and racial discrimination was embedded in it. The Mabo case provided 
the High Court with an opportunity to revisit the matter. 
 
The first chance meeting between Eddie (Koiki) Mabo, then working as a gardener at 
James Cook University, and academic historian Henry Reynolds occurred many years 
before the proceedings came before the High Court. In the intervening period, Reynolds 
organised a conference on land rights, a decision was made to bring the challenge, and 
Justice Moynihan of the Queensland Supreme Court undertook a fact-finding expedition 
to the Murray Islands.  
 
[At this point, we put up a slide of the Murray Islands – an idyllic tropical island 
paradise ringed by blue water, as seen from the air. The caption reads ‘My island 
home?’ We would like to play the Warumpi Band’s My Island Home, from 1987, made 
famous in a later version by Christine Anu. Yet again we are thwarted; there is no 
equipment to enable us to do so. Instead, Greta recites some of the lyrics. 
 
They say home is where you find it 
Will this place ever satisfy me? 
For I come from the saltwater people 
We always lived by the sea . . . 
My island home is waiting for me. . . 
I close my eyes and I’m standing 
In the boat on the sea again 
And I’m holding that long turtle spear 
And I feel I’m close now 
To where it must be  
My Island home is waiting for me.] 
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland met in a public hall under the sign Gelar Meta Ged 
Sikarem, which meant ‘Protect the law of home and land’. The purpose of this inquiry 
was to collect evidence about Meriam law and ascertain the facts for the High Court 
hearing. The islanders demonstrated that they had strict rules about interests in land; for 
instance, prior to colonisation, they had harsh penalties for trespass. There were court 
records documenting their extensive litigation in relation to disputes over land.  
 
[The next slide shows the Murray Islanders in traditional costume, dancing. The caption 
reads ‘Dancing the law’.] 
 
The Murray Islanders claimed that they had never ceded their property rights and that 
their traditional law was still in operation. They further claimed that their native title 
rights were recognised at common law. In order to demonstrate that the ‘tide of history’ 
had not washed away their connection to land, the islanders danced their law for Justice 
                                                
77 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267. 
78 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141, 273. 
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Moynihan. Thus, dancing, song, art and other performance, as well as photographic and 
written records, provided a compelling body of evidence to document the land law of the 
Murray Islanders.  
 
An attempt by the Queensland government to sabotage the claim failed when legislation 
passed specifically for that purpose was held to contravene the Racial Discrimination 
Act.79 The land rights challenge then arrived in the High Court. In the Mabo case, six 
judges held that the Murray islanders had native title rights to their land recognised in the 
common law. The dissenting judge was Justice Dawson. 
 
In Mabo, the High Court had to come to terms with a completely different system of law, 
made up of quite different performative moments and occasions to those which are of 
significance in the Australian legal system. The meeting of two legal systems is 
symbolised in the accompanying slide. 
 
[The slide depicts the white lawyers who represented the Murray Islanders, Greg 
McIntyre and Brian Keon-Cohen, surrounded by islanders. The lawyers, despite their 
otherwise relatively conservative costumes, are wearing woven hats and sipping on 
coconut juice. During this 1989 visit to Mer, McIntyre and Keon-Cohen viewed the 
mounds and stones which represented property boundaries, were shown traditional 
methods of food production, and learned to speak and read some of the local language.] 
 
Here, law was being performed on another stage, with new actors. Yet it was the 
introduced Australian law which was the most powerful, and ultimately the success of the 
Mabo case depended upon recognition of Murray Islander law by Australian judges, in an 
Australian courtroom.  
 
The High Court was criticised by some commentators for recognising the legitimacy of 
the Murray Islanders’ traditional rights to land; Mabo was described as the decision of an 
activist court. The current Chief Justice of the High Court, Robert French, has recently 
pointed out that there are many definitions of judicial activism;80 he refers to ‘the almost 
meaningless rubric of “judicial activism”’81 but acknowledges that in Australia, debate 
about judicial activism is triggered most often in the context of judicial review of 
executive action. Another current High Court judge, Dyson Heydon, has been more 
critical of judicial activism, including the activism in the Mabo case, in a 2003 speech 
delivered at a Quadrant dinner.82 Indeed, the Mabo decision made many people deeply 
uncomfortable. The judges had demonstrated their power to play with precedent and with 
the texture and rules of the common law. 
 
Despite the inherent playfulness of the decision, the High Court did not bestow upon the 
holders of traditional native title rights the same sort of legal recognition enjoyed by 
                                                
79 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); see Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
80 Robert French, ‘Judicial activists – mythical monsters?’ (2008) 12 Southern Cross University Law 
Review 59, 67. 
81 Ibid 73. 
82 Dyson Heydon, ‘Judicial activism and the death of the rule of law’ (2003) Jan/Feb Quadrant 9. 
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owners of other property rights. Native title rights were usufructory or bare; they did have 
the fullness of other property rights. Furthermore, they were inferior to any competing 
non-Indigenous use, and their destruction did not warrant compensation. Michael Mansell 
has described these rights as only a step above ‘mere possession’.83 Thus, the ‘legacy of 
unutterable shame’84 remained. Peter Fitzpatrick has observed that law is not innocent of 
racism.85 The Australian common law was still tainted by racial discrimination, and the 
inferior status of the land rights conferred on Aboriginal people suggested their inferior 
legal status. 
 
The Mabo decision displaced the myth of terra nullius, but the Court did not attempt to 
disturb the stability of the Australian legal system by discarding its foundations, and nor 
did it permit a ‘fracturing’ of the principles of this system.86 A white-washed version of 
terra nullius was retained. The so-called ‘judicial revolution’87 had ushered in but a 
‘cautious correction’.88 
 
[The woman chairing our session stopped Greta here as we were out of time, and the 
remainder of our paper remained unperformed. But here it is anyway – the text of the 
missing performance, in which we intended to extend and finish our discussion of judging 
as playfulness.] 
 
THE ‘AWFULNESS OF LAWFULNESS’: THE AL-KATEB CASE 
 
Greta pre-empts her discussion of the Al-Kateb case by considering the playfulness of the 
High Court’s ‘great dissenter’:89 recently-retired Justice Michael Kirby. The Al-Kateb 
case is but one decision in which Justice Kirby’s powerful dissent, as we have argued in 
another context, ‘provide[s] a contextualised critique of the often legalistic judgments of 
his fellow judges’ and ‘allow[s] us to deconstruct the legalistic reasoning of the 
majority’.90 
 
[The slide depicts a painting by Ralph Heimans of seven judges, all wigged and robed in 
the red robes of the New South Wales Supreme Court. The painting is entitled Radical 
Restraint: A Portrait of Justice Michael Kirby. Four judges are grouped together in 
collegial solidarity. Two others are engaged in discussion. The faces of these six judges 
are either completely or partially obscured. In the foreground is Justice Kirby, also 
                                                
83 Quoted in Greta Bird, The Process of Law in Australia – Intercultural perspectives (2nd ed, 1993) 323. 
84 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, 79 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
85  Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Racism and the innocence of law’ (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 119, 119. 
86 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, 28 (Brennan J). 
87 See Margaret Stephenson and Suri Ratnapala, (eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution – The Aboriginal Land 
Rights Decision and Its Impact on Australian Law (1993). 
88 Garth Nettheim, ‘Judicial revolution or cautious correction’ (1993) 16 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 1. See also Phillip Falk and Gary Martin, ‘Misconstruing Indigenous sovereignty: maintaining 
the fabric of Australian law’ in Moreton-Robinson, above n 74, 34. The authors write: ‘in the Mabo 
decision, the High Court conveniently found that the issue of Indigenous Sovereignty was non-justiciable.’ 
89 Michael Lavarch, ‘Great Dissenter is no ordinary judge’ The Australian (Sydney), 30 January 2009 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,,24981425-17044,00.html>. 
90 Greta Bird and Nicole Rogers, ‘Art or artifice: Judging in troubled times’ (2008) 12 Southern Cross 
University Law Review vii, xi. 
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attired in red robes but without his wig. He alone is facing the viewer, a half smile on his 
face.] 
 
Justice Kirby has written of the importance of dissent, and pointed out that dissenting 
viewpoints can become the orthodoxy of the future.91 He has stated that ‘the right to 
disagree or dissent from the majority view in courts when things seem wrong or unjust is 
one of the most precious freedoms that exist in a democracy.’92 He is playful in the sense 
that he enjoys the creativity which the common law tradition offers judges, and exploits 
the aporias present in the text of statutes. Indeed, he has been described as a court jester.93 
Kirby is a staunch defender of human rights and draws on international law in order to 
play with the common law. His dissenting judgments in cases like the Al-Kateb case 
move law towards Derrida’s impossible justice. In a globalised world, Kirby’s approach 
is both radical and prudent. 
 
[The next slide, entitled ‘An unlawful non-citizen is being detained’, depicts the benign 
visage of Iraqi asylum seeker Abbas Al Khafaji, who together with Palestinian non-
citizen Ahmed Al-Kateb unsuccessfully sought freedom from indefinite detention in the 
High Court proceedings known as the Al-Kateb case.] 
 
Ahmed Al-Kateb was declared to be an unlawful non-citizen upon his arrival in 
Australia. According to the Migration Act 1958, he could therefore be held in detention 
until he was deported. However, Al-Kateb could not be deported anywhere as he was a 
stateless person. On the majority’s positivist black letter interpretation of the statute, Al-
Kateb could therefore be held in detention for the rest of his life. It did not matter why 
Al-Kateb had arrived in Australia, and the morality or injustice of this outcome was also 
irrelevant. Justice McHugh wrote that ‘whatever criticism some – maybe a great many – 
Australians make of such laws, their constitutionality is not in doubt.’94 
 
We would propose that the Australian legal system must become more cosmopolitan. Our 
current system with its focus upon the rights-bearing individual citizen must adapt to 
changing global phenomena; one such phenomenon is the flood of refugees who are 
either stateless or the citizens of dysfunctional states that can no longer supply their basic 
human needs. 
 
[We display a picture of a child throwing a stone at a tank. The caption is ‘Facing 
violence’.] 
 
Violence and senseless destruction are an unwelcome part of the daily existence of 
people in many parts of the world. Children come face to face with weapons of 
destruction. We who live in peace, in a country without violent conflict, can fail to 
                                                
91 Michael Kirby, ‘Consensus and dissent and the proposal for an Australian Statute of Rights’ (2008) 12 
Southern Cross University Law Review 129, 137. 
92 Ibid 143. 
93 Jonathon Pearlman, ‘Jesters brought humour to High Court’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 3 
September 2007, 1. 
94 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124, 137 (McHugh J). 
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understand the plight of people who leave their homes and enter Australia illegally. If we 
think back to the refugees who escaped the brutalities of Nazi Germany during and before 
the Second World War, we can gain an insight into the desire for peace and security 
which motivates Australia’s asylum seekers. 
 
[The next image is of an Iraqi city street. People, including a man and child, walk 
through the war-torn ruins. This caption simply reads ‘Home’.] 
 
Home is a word which conjures up safety, security and stability. It is a place to bring up 
family and welcome friends. Home can be destroyed in an instant. Many of the people 
who come to Australia have experienced the trauma of losing their home. They come 
here in the hope that their lives will be improved. What does the legal system offer them? 
 
[The slide shows people struggling behind the barbed wire fences of an Australian 
detention centre, seeking to climb over them.] 
 
Here we see the result of the search for asylum. They are locked away in detention 
centres. 
 
Derrida states that hospitality is impossible, because it requires admitting a person 
without enquiring who they are.95 As Derrida writes, ‘absolute hospitality requires that I 
open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner . . . but to the absolute, 
unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them . . . without seeking either 
reciprocity or even their names.’96 This is not possible. He states: ‘We would not simply 
leave the house with no doors, no keys and so on and so forth’.97 While unconditional 
hospitality may be impossible, Derrida himself was involved in political activities to 
assist asylum seekers. There can be a movement towards hospitality when we offer 
sanctuary and asylum to those who are different to ourselves.  
 
There was no offer of sanctuary or asylum in the Al-Kateb case. Justice Hayne noted that 
‘because Immigration Detention Centres are places of confinement having many, if not 
all, of the physical features commonly found in prisons, it is easy to equate confinement 
in such a place with punishment.’98 However, he and the other majority judges did not 
make this mistake. According to the majority, Al-Kateb was not being punished, but 
merely confined. The razor wires, the many invasions of privacy, the boredom and the 
hopelessness were irrelevant in their interpretation of the non-punitive nature of such 
detention. 
 
[The final image is the photo of an unhappy child, clutching the barbed wire of the prison 
fence and peering through the wire with a look of stoic despair.] 
 
                                                
95 Jacques Derrida, Of hospitality (Rachel Bowlby trans, 2000). 
96 Ibid 25. 
97 Paul Patton and Terry Smith (eds), Jacques Derrida Deconstruction Engaged: The Sydney Seminars 
(2001) 101. 
98 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124, 190 (Hayne J). 
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Here we illustrate yet another example of ‘the awfulness of lawfulness’, the Re Woolley 
case99; in this case, the High Court held that it could not release children from detention, 
despite evidence of physical, sexual and mental trauma and despite Australia being a 
signatory of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Thus we conclude our discussion 
of playfulness and its antithesis, lawfulness, with the evocative image of a small child 
confined behind barbed wire. 
 
‘To ban play is, in fact, to massacre the innocents.’100 
 
As we write our paper for publication, we reflect on our arguments and ask whether play 
is the path to impossible justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
99 Re Woolley, Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (2004) 210 ALR 369. 
100 Turner, above n 30, 169. 
